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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN MISSOURI
HENRY J. SCHMANDT t
In 1875, Missouri introduced to the science of American poli-
tics the then "startling" innovation of constitutional home rule1
-a device that has been described as exemplifying "something of
the pioneer's daring originality of spirit in the matter of political
institutions. '2 Home rule, or the privilege granted to local com-
munities to frame, adopt, and amend their own charters, was not
in itself novel since a few states had previously permitted certain
of their cities to enjoy some freedom in this respect. In all such
cases, however, the authorization had emanated from the legisla-
ture and hence had been entirely under the control and at the
mercy of that body. The Missouri plan, for the first time in
American political history, established municipal home rule by
constitutional grant, so that theoretically at least the device was
placed beyond the pale of legislative encroachment or annulment.
As incorporated in the constitution of 1875, the home rule privi-
lege was extended only to St. Louis and to such other cities as
might attain a population of more than 100,000.3 The 1945 con-
stitution liberalized this provision by granting similar authority
to all cities of over 10,000 population.4
Municipal home rule in Missouri, especially for the larger com-
munities, continues to be a problem of vital and important con-
cern. The great demands placed upon the resources and ingenu-
ity of urban areas in a period marked by the rapid expansion
of municipal services have made it well-nigh imperative for local
governments to enjoy a maximum degree of freedom and dis-
cretion in both legislative and administrative matters. The
theory of home rule is founded on the belief that the communities
themselves, since they are closer and more familiar with local
problems, are generally in a better position than any higher
echelon of government to understand and to deal sympathetically
t Assistant Professor of Government, St. Louis University.
1. Mo. CONST. Art. IX, §§ 16, 20 (1875).
2. MCBAIN, THE LAW PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HoME RULE 133 (1916).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. Mo. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 19. To date, five (St. Louis, Kansas City,
University City, Springfield, and Columbia) of the twenty-two cities in
Missouri now eligible to adopt home rule charters have availed themselves
of this privilege. Three others, Joplin, Webster Groves, and Ferguson, are
presently engaged in the process of drafting such constitutional charters.
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with them. This is in accord with the sound Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion of strong and self-reliant local government. The chief goals
of home rule have therefore been: (1) to prevent or minimize.
legislative interference in matters that are primarily of local
concern; (2) to permit the local communities to adopt the type
and form of government they desire; (3) to provide the cities.
with sufficient powers to meet the increasing needs for local
services without the necessity of repeatedly seeking new author-
ity from the legislature as they are compelled to do when the,
charters are legislative enactments.5
These basic aims of municipal home rule have seldom been
looked upon by the courts with any degree of enthusiasm or even
favor. As was frequently the case, the members of the judiciary-
were equipped neither by temperament nor training to deal with
this new concept of city government, so that they tended to look
upon home rule as an attempt by the cities to usurp legislative
power and to set themselves up as independent communities free.
from state control. Such an attitude seems to have been par-
ticularly prevalent in Missouri where the history of local rule,
is heavily .weighted with the judicial decisions that have at-
tempted to define the position of self-chartered municipalities,
and their relationship vis a vis the state., The role that the.
judiciary has played in determining the fate of home rule both
in Missouri and elsewhere has been greatly magnified not only-
because of the difficulties which are inherent in the interpreta-
tion of any grant of power to political entities, but also because-
of the unwillingness of constitution makers to define more clearly
the status of self-chartered communities. While the present
article is concerned primarily with the contemporary legal status.
5. For a recent analysis of the objectives of home rule see MoTT, HOMo:
RULE FOR AimECA'S CITiEs (1949).
6. This attitude of suspicion was overtly evident at late as 1928 whem
a member of the court in State ex rel. Hussman v. St. Louis, 319 RIo. 497,.
5 S.W.2d 1080 (1928), exclaimed:
There is much in some of the writings upon this case [Euwing case,
text supported by note 12 infra] that smacks strongly of the "im-
penum In impero" doctrine as to matters of local government for
St. Louis.... [S]ad will be the day when such a view ... shall
ever become law in this State. Up to this good hour our court has
stood with a firm face against it, with only an occasional muttering to
the effect that such a charter is to the city what the Constitution is to
the State. These mutterings are without foundation. They would es-
tablish home rule for such cities by ordinances rather than by state,
laws.
Id. at 529, 5 S.W.2d at 1093.
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of the home rule municipality in Missouri, a brief recounting of
the judicial background and of the major trends that have mani-
fested themselves in earlier court pronouncements is unavoid-
able.7
Home rule in Missouri was unfortunately born with serious
congenital defects. When the constitution makers of 1875 were
prevailed upon to accept the plan for local autonomy proposed
by the St. Louis delegation, their uncertainty as to the signi-
ficance of the new device and their fear that the sovereignty of
the state might in somewise be impaired caused them to surround
the enabling grant with such restrictive phraseology that they
left the matter of home rule in a state of ambiguity. In the con-
stitution as finally drafted they provided that charters adopted
pursuant to the grant "shall always be in harmony with and sub-
ject to the Constitution and laws of Missouri,"'8 and the addi-
tional safeguard that "the General Assembly shall have the same
power over the city and county of St. Louis that it has over other
cities and counties of this state."9 This latter clause was deleted
in the new constitution adopted in 1945, but the former proviso
has been retained virtually unchanged. 10 Taken at face value, this
language would appear to indicate that what the state gave with
one hand it took away with the other. For if the charter must
conform to statutory law as well as to the organic document,
how could a constitutionally guaranteed sphere of local autonomy
exist? The legislature under such circumstances could at will
render any charter provision inoperative simply by passing a
7. For a more comprehensive treatment of the earlier decisions see
MCBAIN, op. cit. supra note 2; MCGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF'
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1933); and SCHMANDT, HIsTORY OF MUNICIPAL,
HOME RuLE IN ST. Louis (1948).
8. Mo. CONST. Art. IX, § 23 (1875).
9. Id. § 25. There were two separate grants incorporated into the
Missouri Constitution, one pertaining to St. Louis, § 20, and the second to;
cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, § 16. Both required the charters
adopted pursuant thereto to be in harmony with state law. Section 25, on
the other hand, was directed solely at St. Louis. It was probably inserted
in the basic law because of the constitutional authorization that was also
ven to the city of St. Louis to separate itself from the county; and the
nvention members, uncertain as to the effects of this additional innova-
tion, wanted to make doubly sure that they were not giving away any of
the lawmaking authority of the General Assembly insofar as St. Louis
was concerned.
10. Mo. CoNST. Art. VI, § 19, the pertinent provision of which states:
"Any city havipg more than 10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt a
charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Con-
stitution and laws of the state ... "
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contrary or conflicting statute. And if the General Assembly had
the same power over St. Louis that it had over any other city
in the state, what possible meaning could home rule have for
the only municipality eligible at that time to adopt it?
Such was the situation that confronted the Missouri courts
when they were called upon to decide cases involving questions
of home rule. Not only were they forced to deal with a new and
untried scheme of municipal government but, what was even
more perplexing, they were faced with the necessity of reading
some semblance of meaning into the vague and apparently con-
tradictory provisions of the organic law which created the device.
That the judicial effort in this regard has met with little success
is readily apparent to the student or the lawyer who attempts,
as the high state tribunal itself once described it, to tread "...the
mazes of adjudication, perhaps to become lost in the labyrinth
of the ingenious and divergent reasons which pervade the cases
in respect to the power ... of municipalities to adopt charters
... ,1-1 To the credit of the court, however, it must be said that no
concerted effort was made to judicially emasculate home rule
in toto as a literal reading of the organic provisions might have
warranted. At the same time, the court's obvious failure to deal
with the problem understandingly and with some degree of con-
sistency has left a legacy of ambiguous and even conflicting de-
cisions which still rise to haunt the tribunal in present day cases.
The first opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court in the inter-
pretation of the constitutional home rule provisions made un-
mistakably clear the supremacy of the General Assembly over
cities adopting such charters. In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle,12 a case
which involved a conflict between a state statute and a provision
of the St. Louis charter prescribing the manner of appointing
local election judges, the court held that the statute governed,
declaring that when the legislature has acted
... by a general law and such law is, in any of its provisions,
in conflict with a charter provision that the law prevails
over the charter in obedience to the mandates of the con-
stitution that "such charter and amendments shall always
be in harmony with and subject to the Constitution and laws
of the state."13
11. State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Commissioners, 184 Mo. 109, 132, 71
S.W. 215, 220 (1902).
12. 85. Mo. 64 (1884).
13. Id. at 78.
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The specification that only a general law (in contradistinction
to a special law, or one which is made applicable only to a par-
ticular municipality) would take precedence over the charter
offered little consolation to the proponents of home rule. By
classifying cities according to population, legislative bodies have
been able to successfully evade the prohibition against special
laws. The General Assembly in Missouri has consistently done
this by passing statutes applicable only to municipalities within
a certain population range, thereby excluding all cities but the
one or several it desired to single out.14
The Ewing decision demonstrated that the measure of local
autonomy to be enjoyed by the cities was almost entirely depen-
dent upon the pleasure and self-restraint of the state lawmakers.
As time passed, the court realized that a more intelligent basis
than this absolute and rigid criterion for resolving conflicts be-
tween state enactments and charter provisions had to be found
if the home rule sections of the constitution were not to be com-
pletely nullified. A new approach toward the solution of this
dilemma was evident by the turn of the century. In State ex rel.
Kansas City v. Field,1 the court held that the freeholders' char-
ter of Kansas City operated to repeal a prior state statute in
respect to street opening proceedings since the subject matter
"naturally falls within the domain of municipal government."'",
And in Kansas City ex rel. Nortk Park District v. Scarritt," the
high tribunal stated that the decision in the Ewing case should
14. For a brief time the court held that the legislature could not single
out St. Louis by a population classification outside of the four classes es-
tablished by law (and limited by the constitution to that number), and
thereby legislate specially for it: St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 41 S.W.
1094 (1898); Murnane v. St. Louis, 123 Mo. 479 27 S.W. 711 (1894). A
contrary position, without specific reference to the two earlier decisions,
was taken in Kansas City v. Stegmiller, 151 Mo. 189, 52 S.W. 723 (1899),
and in State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524 (1899). In
these latter two cases, the court held that the constitutional provision direct-
ing the General Assembly to provide for no more than four classes of cities
and towns (Mo. CONST. Art. IX, § 7 (1875) did not apply to municipalities
adopting home rule charters, but that such cities constituted an additional
class distinct from those chartered and classified by the legislature. This
meant that the General Assembly might legislate directly for such cities
without infringing the constitution. Although this was the rule followed
in subsequent cases, it was not until 1928 in State ex rel. Carpenter v. St.
Louis, 318 Mo. 8i0, 2 S.W.2d 713 (1928), that the classification doctrine
announced in the Murnane and Dorr cases was expressly overruled.
15. 99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1889).
16. Id. at 356, 12 S.W. at 803.
17. 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845 (1895).
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not be held to warrant the exercise of state legislative power
over home rule charters sQ far as relates to the government of
subjects of merely local and municipal concern. Finally, in St.
Louis v. Meyer,28 the court expressly declared that home rule
charters need be in harmony with and subject to only those laws
of the state which are of general as distinguished from local con-
cern. This was the very same criterion that Joseph Pulitzer of St.
Louis, an ardent home rule advocate, had insisted upon at the
constitutional convention almost thirty years before but which
that body had not seen fit to incorporate into the organic docu-
ment.19 Had it done so, much of the previous litigation might
have been avoided and home rule established on a more solid
foundation.
The validity of this state-local or primary interest test was
thrown into doubt after a brief period of use by the decision in
State ex rel. Garner 'v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Com-
pany,20 in which it was held that the City of St. Louis had no
authority to set the rates for local telephone service even though
such action conflicted in no way with state laws or regulations.
Indicating its disapproval of the state-local criterion, the court
said:
[I]t is extremely unfortunate that this Court ever at-
tempted to solve the problem by drawing a distinction be-
tween matters of mere local concern anq matters of state
concern, and to say that as to matters of mere local concern
the municipality has power to legislate. To my mind no fixed,
certain, general or intelligible rule can be formulated upon
such a distinction, which will answer or solve the questions
that will arise. 21
The court then declared that a home rule city had no authority
to exercise a function that was of a governmental as distin-
guished from a proprietary nature without an express grant
from the legislature regardless of whether the matters covered
by such function were essentially of local concern or not. A
strict application of this doctrine would obviously leave a home
rule city helpless in the absence of statutory authorization to
pass any ordinance involving the exercise of its taxing or police
18. 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (1904).
19. 12 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875
461 (Loeb & Shoemaker ed. 1930).
20. 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905).
21. Id. at 104, 88 S.W. at 44.
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powers. The only discretion that a self-chartered municipality
could exercise under such an interpretation would be in respect
to its purely corporate or proprietary activities such as the
maintenance of streets and sewers, and the furnishing of water,
electricity, or other utilities. Fortunately for the cause of home
rule, this construction was overlooked for the next twenty-five
years as the court returned to the doctrine of state-local interests
in determining the powers of home rule cities and in resolving
conflicts between statutory enactments and charter provisions. 22
The Garner doctrine, however, proved to be of more than his-
torical or academic interest since it has recently reappeared in
modified form, as will presently be shown.
A further development in the judicial position toward home
rule occurred in 1928, when the court held that both the zoo 23
and the public library system of St. Louis24 were educational
institutions and as such fell within the category of governmental
rather than proprietary functions. The court was most likely
influenced by its desire to keep these institutions out of political
control,25 but in doing so it was compelled to interpret the dis-
22. While the acceptance of the state-local interest test was significant,
it proved to be of limited advantage to the home rule cities, for in almost
every instance in which a charter provision came into conflict with a state
statute, the latter was upheld by the court: St. Louis v. Tielkmeyer, 226
Mo. 130, 125 S.W. 1123 (1910) (regulation of liquor sales); St. Louis v.
Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (1904) (licensing of peddlers). On the
other hand, when there was no conflict with state statutes, the power of
the city was readily upheld: St. Louis v. Bernard, 249 Mo. 51, 155 S.W.
394 (1912) (regulating the hours of opening and closing grocery shops);
St. Louis v. DeLassus, 205 Mo. 578, 104 S.W. 12 (1907) (prohibiting the
sale of meat on Sunday); St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464, 89 S.W. 611
(1905) (setting up standards for milk purity). The only significant ex-
ceptions to this pattern of judicial action have been in matters pertaining
to the opening and grading of streets, the construction of sewers, and the
establishment of parks. In several of these instances, charter provisions
have been held to supersede contrary state laws. See In re East Bottom
Drainage & Levee District v. Kansas City, 305 Mo. 577, 259 S.W. 89
(1924) ; Kansas City ex rel. North Park District v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642,
29 S.W. 845 (1895); Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1888).
23. State ex rel. Zoological Board v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 1 S.W.2d
1021 (1928).
24. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713
(1928).
25. The library and the zoo had been established under legislative en-
abling acts which provided for an independent governing boardand which
required the city to levy and collect annually a fixed mill tax for the sup-
port of these institutions. The city's attempt in 1927 to assert control over
the appropriation to the library and zoo on the grounds that their operation
and maintenan'ce were matters of municipal concern over which the Gen-
eral Assembly could exercise no authority (such as specifying the tax rate
for their support) brought on the suits in question.
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tinction between functions of local and those of state concern
in such a way as to further narrow the home rule zone. For if
such an institution as a zoo is not a matter of purely local con-
cern in which a charter provision would take precedence over a
legislative act, then it is difficult to conceive of any matter which
theoretically could not be controlled by state action. What was
more significant, however, than the meaning given to matters of
state-local interest in these specific instances was the strong sug-
gestion that the General Assembly could assume jurisdiction over
any function of a home rule city except its municipal corporate
concerns. In State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis,6 it was stated
that:
. .. [A] municipal corporation may be considered in two as-
pects: that which relates to its corporate functions only, and
that in which it discharges certain governmental functions,
police powers delegated to it. Matters of purely municipal
corporate concern a special charter may control .... 27
The emphasis here was not on the state-local interest standard
but on the governmental-proprietary function concept as the de-
termining test of municipal authority. While the exercise of all
proprietary activities is essentially a matter of local concern,
there are many functions performed by the city in its non-corpo-
rate or governmental capacity that are primarily of a local nature
such as fire protection, traffic control, and the licensing of busi-
nesses. To apply the criterion implicit in the Carpenter case in
preference to the traditional rule of primary interest would deny
local autonomy over these vital activities. Furthermore, as the
numerous cases pertaining to municipal liability show, the dis-
tinction between governmental and corporate functions is as
much a subject of dispute and uncertainty as is that between
general and local interests.
If there were any doubts as to the judicial acceptance of the
governmental-proprietary function rule, they were unequivocally
resolved in Coleman v. Kansas City, 2 a case which dealt with a
conflict between the provisions of a state statute and the Kansas
City charter pertaining to the salaries of the local license collec-
tor. In holding that the statute prevailed, the court declared:
... [A] s to matters pertaining to private, local corporate func-
26. 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (1928).
27. Id. at 893, 2 S.W.2d at 720.
28. 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (1946).
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tions the city holds its power independent of control by the
General Assembly, but as to governmental functions the
State retains control. On this point the city's argument is
wholly based on the fact that the license taxes are used ex-
clusively for municipal purposes. That fact is not determina-
tive. The distinction is not between local and general con-
cern, but between corporate and governmental functions.
The power of taxation is a governmental function .... 21
[Italics added.]
It should be observed that the Carpenter and Coleman cases did
not constitute a complete return to the Garner doctrine insofar
as that ruling would deny a home rule city control over any gov-
ernmental function in the absence of statutory delegation. The
two later cases would permit a self-chartered municipality to
exercise jurisdiction and control over such activities without
legislative authorization if they were primarily of local concern
and if there was no contrary or conflicting enactment of the Gen-
eral Assembly in existence. This was the rule that was empha-
sized in a comprehensive summation of the powers of a home rule
city which the court undertook in Kansas City v. J. I. Case
Threshing Machine Company.0 Admitting that its prior de-
cisions were by no means harmonious, the court defined the sig-
nificance of local rule, saying:
It is an essential element of all constitutional provisions
establishing the principle of municipal home rule that the
Constitution and general laws of the State shall continue in
force within the municipalities which have framed their own
charters, and that the power of the municipality to legislate
shall be confined to municipal affairs. On the other hand,
after the adoption of a home rule charter by a municipal
corporation, the Legislature cannot, even by a general law,
affect the powers of the municipality with respect to matters
of municipal and local concern.31
Although this passage would seem to adhere to the state-local
interest test, the court went on to interpret what it meant by
municipal affairs in terms of the governmental-proprietary func-
tion doctrine, thereby compounding the confusion rather than
clarifying the issue as it had set out to do:
[A]s to its form of organization and as to its private,
local corporate functions, and the manner of exercising
29. Id. at 161, 182 S.W.2d at 77.
30. 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
31. Id. at 923, 87 S.W.2d at 200.
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them, the Constitutional provision grants to the people of the
cities designated, part of the legislative power of the State
for the purpose of determining such matters and incorporat-
ing them in their charter as they see fit, free from the con-
trol of the General Assembly .... [I]n matters, which are
governmental functions, the State retains control and as to
such matters, the provisions of a city charter, although
adopted under the constitutional provision therefor, must be
and remain consistent with and subject to the statutes of the
State enacted by the Legislature.
It is ... sometimes difficult to determine the border line
between governmental and corporate functions. ... How-
ever, certain functions have, by this court, definitely been
determined governmental, the control of which remains in
the State. The police power is one .... Soihe of the other
matters, which are purely governmental functions, are those
pertaining to suffrage and elections, education, regulation
of public utilities and administration of justice .... These
may be delegated to or taken away from the city in whole or
in part, within the wisdom of the Legislature.2
Despite the court's patent inconsistency and lack of preciseness
in terminology, it now appeared from this series of cases that the
constitutional ambiguities of the home rule provisions had finally
been resolved in favor of the governmental-corporate functions
doctrine, with the problem of distinguishing between the activi-
ties which fall into these respective categories remaining.
As might be anticipated, the question bf revenue is the most
important single issue facing home rule municipalities today. The
inability or unwillingness of the rural dominated legislatures to
understand the financial plight of the larger urban areas has un-
derscored the demand of the municipalities for a substantial mea-
sure of freedom in working out their local tax problems. The sub-
ject of taxation as an incident of local autonomy has involved two
aspects: one, the extent to which a self-chartered city can levy
taxes without specific authorization from the legislature; and
two, the extent, if any, to which such a municipality can exercise
that power free from legislative interference. As to the first
problem, the Missouri courts have generally sustained the right
of home rule cities to levy taxes without statutory delegation in
those instances where the tax was not in conflict or already ap-
propriated for state use by the General Assembly. At an early
date, the supreme court of the state declared:
32. Id. at 926, 927, 87 S.W.2d at 202, 203.
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.. [I) t must be presumed that the framers of the constitu-
tion had in their minds the fact that it was wholly impossible
to conduct city government in a city like St. Louis without
the power of taxation being vested in those charged with
conducting such government. The right to adopt a charter
necessarily implied the right to put in it such provisions as
would enable the city to maintain its government.3 3
So also in 1928, the levy of a city tax by St. Louis on cigarettes
sold in packages was upheld,34 and in 1930 the right of the city to
impose a license tax on the sale of gasoline was affirmed.3 5 In
neither case was there any statutory authority for such levies.
With respect to the second aspect, there existed for a time some
indication that the court would protect a home rule city from
legislative interference if the tax was one of strictly municipal
concern.36 By the time of the Coleman case, with its reiteration
of the governmental-corporate function test, any such hope had
vanished and it had become settled law that enactments of the
General Assembly involving taxation always prevail over incon-
sistent charter provisions.
This leaves one question as to taxation not fully determined.
If the state has pre-empted to itself a tax source but has not
specifically prohibited the cities from imposing a similar tax,
would the imposition of such a tax by a home rule municipality
be contrary to law? In Kansas City v. Frogge,37 a 1943 decision,
a Kansas City ordinance imposing a compensating use tax on all
tangible personal property purchased for use in the city upon
which no sales tax had been paid was held invalid. The court
said that the tax did not regulate within Kansas City a competi-
tive condition which was local or municipal in character but one
which obtained throughout the state due to the statewide applica-
tion of the Sales Tax Act. Since the legislature had not attempted
to deal with this situation in the Sales Tax Act and had not
delegated the power to the city to do so, the court concluded that
the use tax ordinance was void. While the decision is not too ex-
plicit in this point, it seems to infer that when the legislature has
appropriated a specific tax source, the cities are thereby forbid-
33. St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289, 298, 299 (1879).34. Ex Parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S.W.2d 22 (1928).
35. Automobile Gasoline Co. v. St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S.W.2d 281(1930).
36. St. Louis v. Bircher, 76 Mo. 431 (1882).
37. 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943).
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den not only to duplicate the tax but to levy any other tax that
might be complementary or closely associated with the one pro-
vided for by statute. And in a later case, the court indicated by
obiter dictum that a municipal income tax would be invalid even
though not specifically forbidden by law since it would "diminish
pro tanto the State's revenue from the State income tax."3 8 These
indications plus the general attitude of the judiciary toward local
autonomy make it reasonably certain that the pre-emption of a
tax source by the General Assembly precludes the home rule
municipality from levying a similar tax without legislative
authorization.
The experience of the City of St. Louis with an earnings tax
is illustrative of the difficulties that surround the whole question
of taxation and home rule. To meet its increasing need for
revenue, in 1946 the city enacted a tax on all salaries and cor-
porate profits earned within its municipal boundaries. 3 The
validity of the tax was promptly attacked on the basis, among
other things, that there was no state law permitting St. Louis to
impose a tax of this nature.40 The Garner case was, of course,
cited in support of this position. The city, on the other hand, in-
sisted, and it would seem correctly so in view of the Carpenter
and Coleman decisions, that no statutory authority for the im-
position of the tax was necessary since the matter was one of
essentially local concern and since there was no question of con-
flict with any existing state law. The court, while paying lip
service to the doctrine enunciated by the city, avoided the real
issues in the case by holding that the provisions of the charter
were not specific enough to authorize the levying of a tax of this
38. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 658, 203 S.W.2d
438, 443 (1947). A somewhat more favorable view was taken in Ploch
v. St. Louis, 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S.W.2d 1020 (1940), in which the court sus-
tained the cigarette tax ordinance of St. Louis as against the objection
that it contravened the state Sales Tax Act prohibiting municipalities from
imposing taxes on sales of personal property subject to the sales tax. The
court held that since the sales tax was paid by the purchaser and the
cigarette tax was an "occupation" tax on the merchant, the two were not
conflicting. Another instance of a more liberal attitude on the part of
the court occurred in State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North
Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762 (1950), in which the power of
Kansas City under its home rule charter to extend its municipal 
boundaries
by annexing territory was upheld, although there was no existing legis-
lative enabling act authorizing it to do so.39. Ciy OF ST. LOUIS ORDINANCE 43783 (1946).
40. a C er t Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 o. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438
(1947).
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nature. The particular clause of the charter at issue stated that
the city shall have power ".... to assess, levy and collect taxes for
all general and special purposes on all subjects or objects of taxa-
tion."41 In its opinion, the court declared that constitutional home
rule is a grant of power to the people of a municipality who may
then delegate to the local government whatever portion of that
authority they deem desirable.42 Since the court felt that the
charter provision just cited gave no clear indication that the
people of St. Louis intended to give its Board of Aldermen the
power to impose an earnings tax, the attempted levy was nullified
for want of organic validity. It seems strange that twenty years
before, the court had ruled that the same section of the St. Louis
charter was ".... sufficiently broad to authorize the city to levy
any kind of a tax which is not inhibited by some other provision
of the charter or by some constitutional or statutory provision."43
Another interesting issue in the earnings tax case was dis-
cussed by the court and left unanswered. Did the applicability of
the tax to non-residents employed within St. Louis make the mea-
sure one of general or state rather than local concern, so that
even with definite charter authorization the levy would have been
unlawful? In this connection, the court said:
41. CITY OF ST. Louis CHARTER Art. I, § 1 (1) (1946).
42. The Court based its decision on Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo.
233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943), in which it was stated:
The people of a city which has been granted the right by the people
of the state to frame and adopt a charter may not deem it desirable
or needful to delegate under the charter of their city all of those
powers which may be delegated by the legislature to cities organized
under general law. So the powers which plaintiff city may exercise,
through the constitutional grant of the right to frame and adopt a
charter, are those powers which the people of the city delegate to it
under its charter, if unrestrained by constitutional limitation.
Id. at 241, 176 S.W.2d at 501. In some states, home rule charters like
state constitutions are considered limitations on the powers of the govern-
ment rather than grants of authority. Under this view, the city would
have the power to impose a tax (assuming it was not contrary to the
constitution or general state laws) unless it was prohibited by the charter.
See Trebilcox v. Sacramento, 91 Cal. App. 257, 266 Pac. 1015 (1928). Such
a rule is more favorable to the cause of local autonomy, but it does not
represent the majority viewpoint. As one authority on municipal govern-
ment has observed.
Unlike the state, which may undertake anything not prohibited by the
state or federal constitution, the cities labor under two handicaps:
they can do nothing which is prohibited to them, and they can only
do what is specifically permitted.
MOTT, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 10.
43. State ex rel. People's Motorbus Co. v. Blaine, 332 Mo. 582, 587,
58 S.W.2d 975, 977 (1932).
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The impact of the "earnings" tax contemplated by the ordi-
nance under adjudication here would fall on nonresidents of
the City who might be residents of any and every county
and city of the State-and other States. And if there be now
or hereafter other cities in the State with charters contain-
ing a provision as broad as Sec. 1, Art. 1, Par. 1 of the St.
Louis charter, they could retaliate with a corresponding or-
dinance which would equally bind citizens of St. Louis and
all other like cities. Certainly such ordinances would not be
matters of purely local concern, from the viewpoint of the
State government.44
The court then went on to make a nebulous if not illogical distinc-
tion between tax measures that are primarily for regulatory
purposes and those that are solely for revenue, saying:
It is true that as regards the police regulations of a city,
all who go there must obey them. So too, perhaps, of some
excise taxes, especially if they are pseudo-regulatory and
therefore partake of the police power. One who buys gaso-
line in St. Louis must pay the tax thereon, and one who pur-
chases cigarettes must pay the stamp tax. But in general
such taxes are imposed only on citizens or residents of thejurisdiction. That is true of our State income tax, Sec.
11343, R.S. 1939-Mo. R.S.A. And the tax considered in the
Frogge case, supra, was imposed on the use of property in
the City, and was evidently aimed at residents. The same
was true of the tax on the storage of gasoline in the People's
Motorbus case, supra. But in the instant case a pure revenue
tax is imposed on non-residents who perform work or ser-
vices within the City. We are not holding the ordinance thatfar invalid, but are ruling merely that it is not authorized
by the abstract provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 1, Par. 1 of the
charter. 5 [Latter italics added.]
The Attorney -General in an opinion issued on July 9, 1953, con-
strued this language to imply that the power to authorize the
imposition of a tax on income earned by residents of St. Louis
and by non-residents employed in St. Louis could be accomplished
by an amendment to the city charter and that a legislative en-
abling act would be unnecessary."6 To many of us it would seem
that the implication in such holding points in the opposite direc-
tion.
The earnings tax decision left the city with two alternatives:
44. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 659, 203 S.W.2d
438, 444 (1943).
45. Id. at 659, 660, 203 S.W.2d at 444.
46. Unpublished.
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either to amend the charter or to seek the passage of an enabling
act in the General Assembly. Although the latter course was
chosen with successful results,47 the danger that is implicit in
such reliance on the understanding and cooperation of the legis-
lature has now become evident. The enabling statute under
which the city is presently imposing the earnings tax expires by
its own terms in April, 1954.48 Despite this fact and heedless of
the earnest pleas of St. Louis officials, the current 1953-54 session
of the General Assembly has now been adjourned sine die with-
out any action being taken to renew or extend the grant. Since
the next regular session does not convene until January, 1955,
the city will be deprived of a vital and necessary source of reve-
nue unless the Governor calls a special session of the General
Assembly and that body reverses its previous position on the tax,
or unless the city takes steps to amend its charter. Even if the
latter course were adopted, it is still doubtful as to how the court
would look upon the tax in view of the state-local interest issue
which was left unanswered in the earnings tax opinion. Home
rule becomes somewhat of a mockery when the mayor of a large
municipality is forced to tour the entire state (as Mayor Tucker
of St. Louis has recently done) in order to canvass the support of
rural groups and rural legislators for a tax program that is ap-
plicable solely to that one city.
The basic issue involved in the earnings tax case, that of the
right of a home rule city to levy taxes without statutory authori-
zation, again came before the court in 1950. ' University City, a
self-chartered municipality, had established sewer districts
within its corporate limits and had issued special tax bills to pay
for the construction costs. The validity of these assessments was
attacked by an affected property owner who contended that the
city had been given no statutory authority to establish sewer
districts. Unlike the situation that St. Louis had faced in the
earnings tax case, the University City charter contained a spe-
cific grant of power to make public improvements including the
construction of sewers. In upholding the validity of the tax, the
court pointed out that while the power to tax is a function inher-
47. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 92.110-92.200 (Supp. 1951).
48. Ibid.
49. Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, Inc., 361 Mo. 504,
235 S.W.2d 355 (1950).
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ent in the state, there are matters governmental in character, in-
cluding taxation, over which a city may exercise authority dele-
gated to it. In the case of a city organized under general law,
delegation is by statute; in the case of a home rule municipality,
the city may exercise such powers of local self-government as
the people of the community have delegated to it by charter.
This is because, the court stated, "the sovereign people of the
State by their Constitution have set over, transferred, or granted
to the people of the city, a part of the state legislative power."50
Hence, charter provisions "consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of the States"5' 1 have the force and effect
of enactments of the General Assembly. This was a reasonable
and logical opinion, and one which could give no cause for com-
plaint to the proponents of local autonomy. The simplicity and
clear-cut nature of the issue involved, the orthodox character of
the tax, and the freedom from any conflict of state-local interests
were undoubtedly contributing factors to the result attained.
At this point, the basis for judicial determination of the
powers of home rule municipalities would seem to have acquired
some degree of certainty were it not for the disturbing language
found in Turner v. Kansas City"2 -language which once again
raised the ghost of the old Garner case doctrine. In upholding
a Kansas City ordinance which prohibited fortune telling for
pay, the court observed that the Garner opinion (upon which the
defendant relied) was too broad in requiring an express legisla-
tive delegation in every instance of governmental functions to
municipalities operating under a constitutional charter. The
court then explained that establishing charges for telephone ser-
vice (the function that had been at issue in the Garner case)
"is such a high governmental prerogative as to require an express
and specific delegation to vest such power in a municipality. 3
Did this mean, as the language patently indicated, that if the
regulation of fortune telling had been considered as the exercise
of a high governmental prerogative, the Kansas City ordinance
would have been declared invalid? Did the court, in other words,
intend that this be another element for judicial ascertainment in
determining the powers of self-chartered municipalities? If so,
50. Id. at 510, 235 S.W.2d at 358.
51. Ibid.
52. 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945).
53. Id. at 864, 191 S.W.2d at 615. (Italics added.)
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whenever a city assumed an activity of a governmental nature,
such function would not only have to conform to the constitution
and laws of the state and be primarily of local rather than gen-
eral concern, but it would also have to be a power that would
not fall into the category of a "high governmental function." To
modify the test of local authority in this way would create chaos
where confusion already existed. It would be conceivable, for
example, that under such a doctrine the court might well hold in
some future case that the levying of an earnings tax involved a
high governmental prerogative which could not be exercised
without a legislative enabling act, no matter how specific the city
charter might be.
Actually, the language of the Turner case constituted little
more than a rationalization of the position that the court had
been taking for many years. Whenever it had been confronted
with the exercise of a novel or other-than-ordinary power by a
home rule municipality, it had usually found some basis for deny-
ing that authority until the legislature had acted. The matter of
zoning by a self-chartered city is a case in point in this respect.
In 1918, when zoning was still regarded as an innovation and
there were no statutory enactments dealing with it, the City of
St. Louis had passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance dividing
the city into residential, commercial, and industrial districts, and
regulating the type of buildings that could be constructed in each
area. 4 The validity of the ordinance was promptly attacked by
the owner of a lot in a residential district who had been denied
permission to erect an industrial plant on his property.5 5 The
court held that since the ordinance made no provision to com-
pensate the owner for damages resulting from the restriction, it
constituted a taking of property without due process of law.
Four years later, after the General Assembly had passed an en-
abling act authorizing the cities to adopt comprehensive zoning
regulations,-" the same type of zoning ordinance for St. Louis
was sustained as a valid exercise of the city'r police power.57 If
54. CITY oF ST. Louis ORDINANCE 30199 (1918).
55. State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256
S.W. 474 (1923).
56. Mo. LAWS 1925, pp. 307-313, as modified in Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 89.
010 et seq. (1949).
57. State ex rel. Cadillac v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720
(1927).
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the old ordinance was unconstitutional because it deprived people,
of their property without due process of law, it is difficult to
understand how a legislative enabling act could correct that de-
fect.
This kind of thinking-the unwillingness to recognize any
municipal authority not of a purely orthodox nature until such
power is first brought under legislative control-might well have
been an influencing factor in the earnings tax case despite the
different basis on which the decision was rested. There is some
indication of this, for in one opinion the court remarked that
the "charter provision relied on by appellants is too indefinite to
support the tax, whick is novel in this State."58 It is also interest-
ing to note that after the General Assembly had given statutory
authorization to St. Louis to levy an earnings tax,'9 the court.
found little difficulty in sustaining the ordinance enacted pur-
suant to the enabling grant.60 While the language of the Turner
case probably did nothing more than give articulation to an atti-
tude that has on occasions been predominant in the court, it cer-
tainly did nothing to relieve any of the uncertainty that surrounds.
the scope of home rule powers. There has been no explicit men-
tion of the "high governmental prerogative" standard in cases,
subsequent to the Turner decision. It is possible that it may be
completely overlooked or disregarded in the future, but it is still
too early to venture an opinion in this respect.
A much more liberal attitude on the part of the judiciary to-
ward home rule appeared at first glance to have been taken in one
of the latest Missouri cases involving a conflict between a state
statute and a local charter.61 The validity of a Kansas City
ordinance that provided for a panel of six jurors to assess dam-
ages for property taken in local condemnation proceedings wa&
attacked by a group of property owners who demanded trial by
a common law jury of twelve as specified by a general statute.
The defendant owners contended that the state law superseded
or in effect repealed the contrary provisions of the charter, while
the city maintained that the statute did not apply or control be-
58. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 658, 203 S.W.2d
438, 444 (1943). (Italics added.)
59. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 99.110-92.200 (Supp. 1951).
60. Walters v. St Louis, 259 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. 1953).
61. In re East Park District of Kansas City, 231 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. App.
1950), aff'd on other grounds, 361 Mo. 829, 237 S.W.2d 118 (1950).
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cause the right of eminent domain is a matter of municipal cor-
porate concern. The Kansas City Court of Appeals upheld the
city's position, quoting with approval an earlier decision to the
effect that "it is settled beyond question that the condemnation
of property in municipalities for the use as public streets, is a
matter pertaining to local municipal government as contradis-
tinguished from such as belong to the domain of general state
control .... 6 2 The decision was affirmed by the supreme court on
certiorari,' 3 but on an entirely different basis than that used by
the court of appeals. Three of the members of the higher tri-
bunal construed the statute in such a way that there was no con-
flict with the charter provisions, and four of the justices con-
curred in the result only because the defendants, even if their
position were sustained, would no longer -be entitled to a trial
before a common law jury because of a subsequent amendment to
the statute in question. No reference or mention of the proprie-
tary-governmental function test was made in any of the affirm-
ing opinions. The court seemed to take it for granted that if an
actual conflict between the statute and the charter had existed,
the former would have prevailed.
A general survey of the many home rule decisions would reveal
that the Missouri Supreme Court has been more favorably in-
clined toward local autonomy in matters pertaining to the police
power of the city than in any other functional area. Not only
has it consistently upheld the regulatory ordinances of the self-
chartered municipalities in this area when no conflicting statute
was involved, but it has also permitted such cities to enlarge on
the provisions of state law when higher standards than those
provided by statute were desired. This tendency has become
quite evident in recent cases. In Vest v. Kansas City,64 an ordi-
nance requiring barbers to undergo a physical examination every
six months was held to be not in conflict with a state law specify-
ing annual examinations. The same result was reached in Bre-
deck v. Board of Education,65 in which the right of the City of
St. Louis to inspect and regulate public school cafeterias as to
62. Id. at 850, citing language from State ex rel. Graham v. Seehorn,
246 Mo. 541, 557, 151 S.W. 716, 720 (1912).
63. In re East Park District of Kansas City, 361 Mo. 829, 237 S.W.2d
118 (1950).
64. 355 Mo. 1, 194 S.W.2d 38 (1946).
65. 213 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. App. 1948).
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health standards was upheld. The court stated that since the
statute authorizing school districts to establish restaurants for
the children contained no specifications for sanitary measures,
the city's action in requiring conformance to its restaurant in-
spection ordinance was not contrary to the state law. And in
Brotherhood of Stationary Engineers v. St. Louis,6 1 an ordinance
enlarging on the provisions of a state law dealing with the quali-
fications and licensing of stationary engineers was sustained. The
court observed:
... [E]ven though there is a state law on a given subject, a
city is not thereby prohibited from enacting a supplemental
ordinance in relation to the same subject, so long as there is
no conflict between the ordinance and the state law. Thus the
fact that the state may have enacted regulations covering
the pursuit of a particular occupation, trade, or calling, will
not prevent a city from exacting additional requirements,
assuming, always, that there is no conflict in the provisions,
and provided, of course, that the statute has not limited the
requirements to its own prescriptions .1
The court's approach in these cases is in decided contrast to the
position it has customarily taken in issues pertaining to local
autonomy, especially those involving tax matters. It seems clear,
and this was expressly stated in Kansas City v. School District of
Kansas City,68 that the taxing power will be strictly construed
against the city while the police power will receive a more liberal
interpretation. Missouri does not stand alone in this respect
since similar views are held in a majority of the other home rule
states.69 Whether there is a rational justification for a distinction
of this kind seems doubtful.
As matters now stand, certain tentative conclusions might be
drawn concerning the present legal status of the self-chartered
municipality in Missouri, although the decisions continue to be
ambiguous and even conflicting in some instances. First of all,
a home rule city may assume any function of a purely corporate
or proprietary nature without legislative interference. What
66. 212 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. App. 1948).
67. Id. at 458, 459.
68. 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930 (1947). See also State ex rel. Hewlett
v. Womack, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809 (1946), in which a city ordinance
restricting the number of liquor licenses was upheld as a regulatory
measure which merely enlarged the requirements of the state liquor con-
trol act.
69. 16 MCQUILMAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.13 (3d ed. 1950).
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constitutes such a function will, however, be narrowly and rigidly
construea against the city especially when there is a question of
conflict with a state statute. Secondly, a home rule city has
power to assume functions of a governmental character without
legislative authorization, provided: (a) no conflicting constitu-
tional or statutory impediment exists; (b) the matters covered
by such function are of primarily local concern; (c) the city
charter embodies the proper and specific authorization; (d) the
function is not one that may be considered a matter of "high
governmental prerogative." These are admittedly broad gen-
eralizations, but they can be little else in view of the wide diver-
sity of judicial decisions which defy categorical treatment.
Two further questions call for consideration: first, what ad-
vantages accrue to a home rule city in Missouri that cannot be
obtained under a legislative charter; and second, what steps, if
any, might be taken to clear up some of the ambiguity and con-
fusion that surrounds the legal aspects of home rule so as to
make more definite and certain the status and powers of a self-
chartered municipality. Eighteen states now have effective mu-
nicipal home rule provisions in their constitutions.70 That there is
revived interest in the device nationally is evidenced by the fact
that after a lapse of fifteen years without a single adoption, two
states, Rhode Island71 and Louisiana,72 enacted such provisions
into their organic law in 1951 and 1952, and similar movements
are afoot elsewhere. To date, more than 600 cities and towns
in the United States have taken advantage of constitutional
grants to frame and adopt their own charters, and the number
is increasing substantially every year.73 These figures demon-
strate the vitality of home rule and raise a strong presumption
that it must possess intrinsic merit despite its impediments.
In Missouri, and this is generally true in other jurisdictions,
the home rule device offers the cities both negative and positive
advantages. Negatively, it serves as a barrier to legislative
interference in local corporate affairs and enables the municipal-
70. BROMAGE, INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADmIN-
ISTRATION 148 (1950). Rhode Island and Louisiana have enacted such
provisions since this publication.
71. R.I. CoNsT. Amend. 28 (1951).
72. LA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 40 (1952).
73. OGG & RAY, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 953 (10th ed.
1951).
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ity to operate its airport, waterworks, power plant, and similar
undertakings free from the direction of the General Assembly.
On the positive side, it possesses several distinctive advantages
which would seem to justify the labor and cost of drafting and
adopting a charter. For one thing, it gives the city a much wider
range of choice and considerably more discretion in its local
governmental and- administrative arrangements. Under the
legislative charter, although there is now some option as to the
type of government the cities in each class may adopt, the or-
ganizational setup including the number of appointive and elec-
tive officials, their salaries and terms of office, their qualifications,
and their powers are carefully provided for by law. With a
home rule charter, the city is free to set up the administrative
system and to organize the departments in the manner it thinks
feasible, to create or abolish elective municipal offices, to adopt
the city manager or commission type government, and to increase
or decrease the size of the common council. It also has authority
"... to prescribe the manner in which nominations shall be made
for municipal offices.., and the form of ballot to be used..." for
their election.74 The powers of the self-chartered municipality
over its own government are strengthened by the constitution
which expressly prohibits the General Assembly from enacting
any law ".... creating or fixing the powers, duties or compensa-
tion of any municipal office or employment for any city framing
or adopting its own charter."'75 By giving the city full control
over its governmental machinery, the responsibility for efficient
administration is placed directly in the hands of the local com-
munity where it properly belongs.
Another advantage enjoyed by the city under home rule is
the authority it possesses to make more extensive use of its
police powers, particularly when it desires to establish higher
health or safety standards than those set by state law. As pre-
viously noted, the Missouri courts have interpreted this phase
of local autonomy in a surprisingly liberal fashion. And finally,
the self-chartered municipality may assume new powers to
meet changing conditions if the matter is primarily of local
concern and the state has not already occupied the field. Under
a legislative charter, the city would have to seek a change in
74. Mo. REv. STAT. § 82.180 (1949).
75. Mo. CONST. Art. VI, § 22 (1945).
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the general laws governing cities of its class before it would
be cloaked with authority to assume such function. This is one
of the most important advantages of home rule, but unfortu-
nately it is the one surrounded by the most uncertainty, as the
earnings tax situation well shows. Charter drafting commissions,
for their part, can help to avoid some of the difficulty that arises
in connection with the assumption of new powers by keeping in
mind that municipal charters in Missouri are considered grants
of authority to the city government, and that it is therefore
necessary for them to contain a full, complete, and specific
enumeration of powers. The narrow construction which the
judiciary tends to place on charter provisions further emphasizes
the importance of explicitly stating the powers. Attention might
also be called to a Missouri statute of long standing which
provides that:
No municipal corporation. .. shall have the power to im-
pose a license tax upon any business avocation, pursuit or
calling, unless such business avocation, pursuit or calling is
specially named as taxable in the charter of such municipal
corporation, or unless such power be conferred by statute.7
Careful draftsmanship may help to assure the city of a larger
measure of local rule, but it cannot solve the basic difficulty that
arises from the nature of the constitutional grant and its inter-
pretation by the courts. This can be accomplished only by a
more progressive approach than that which Missouri constitu-
tion makers have heretofore been willing to take. The 1943-44
Constitutional Convention afforded an excellent opportunity for
a re-examination of the entire home rule question in the light
of seventy years experience and for correcting its organic
weaknesses. The results, however, were most disappointing.
In addition to extending the grant to all cities of over 10,000,
and to all counties of over 85,000 inhabitants-' the new document
contained three improvements. It omitted the meaningless sec-
tion which specified that the General Assembly shall have the
same power over the city and county of St. Louis that it has
over other cities and counties in the state, and it included two
new provisions: Section 21 endowing a home rule city with
power to undertake slum clearance projects, and Section 22,
76. Mo. RmV. STAT. 71.610 (1949). (Italics added.)
77. MO. CONST. Art. VI, § 18(a).
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previously referred to, assuring the city a free hand in regard
to the form and organization of its own government. But the
real issue pertaining to the scope of local autonomy was left
untouched, and the old clause around which so much litigation
had revolved-that the charter shall be in harmony with the
constitution and laws of the state-was written into the new
constitution without change. As one member of the Convention
has explained: "since the recent convention did not wish to.
disturb the court decisions affecting St. Louis and Kansas City,
it did not change the provision requiring charters to conform
with state laws." 711 It was precisely because of these decisions
and the uncertainty which they had created over the sphere of
home rule powers that the constitution-makers should have en-
deavored to clarify the question, if possible, by organic means.
The experience of other states indicates that while there is
no magic formula for solving the problem of city-state relations,
some of the uncertainty as to the authority of a home rule city
can be removed by proper constitutional phraseology. Three
different forms of incorporating the home rule grant into the
fundamental law have been used: (1) the older and more preva-
lent type which includes a single broad grant of local autonomy
subject to the laws of the state; (2) a general grant of authority
followed by an enumeration of certain matters as definitely fall-
ing under.the jurisdiction of the city; (3) a broad conveyance of
power over local affairs subject to statutory enactments which
affect every city and town in the state. Missouri and originally
California fell within the first category. When the latter state
adopted home rule in 1879, it copied the language of the Missouri
constitution almost verbatim.79 The literal interpretation which
the California courts placed on the grant by holding all charter
provisions subject to state law led to the enactment of a constitu-
tional amendment specifying that such charters were to be sub-
ject to and controlled by general laws "except in municipal
affairs."8' 0 This is, of course, the same result that the Missouri
courts eventually arrived at without a change in the organic law,
so that even had the last convention added a clause of this nature
78. Bradshaw, Home Rule for Missouri Cities, MISsouIU MUNICIPAL
REviEw, April 1946, p. 52.
79. CALIF. CONST. Art. XI, § 6 (1879).
80. CALiF. CONST. Art. XI, § 6 (Amendment of 1896).
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to the new document, little difference in the existing situation
would have been effected.
In several jurisdictions, notably Colorado and Utah, the general
grant of home rule powers is accompanied by a partial definition
of local affairs."' The Colorado constitution lists certain powers
as essentially local, such as the levying of taxes and special as-
sessments, and the control of municipal elections; it then con-
cludes with the statement ". . . and all other powers necessary,
requisite, or proper for the government and administration of its
local and municipal matters. ' '1 2 There is much to be said for a
plan of this kind, since the greatest difficulties in home rule states
have resulted from the use of general or vague terms in the or-
ganic grants. This is why it has been necessary to call upon the
courts so frequently for clarification. As the report of the Com-
mittee on State-Local Relations of the Council of State Govern-
ments pointed out:
It is difficult ... to separate state from local functions. A
complete specific enumeration of powers to be exercised by
home rule cities is therefore impossible. Nevertheless, it
seems both possible and highly desirable that some specified
powers be given to localities in addition to the general grant
of authority over local affairs. Rather than leaving the en-
tire field of home rule powers to the definition of the courts,
there seems no valid reason why an enumeration of powers
cannot be conferred upon cities in every home rule state. In
the process of this enumeration, those powers which have
been the cause of the greatest litigation in the past could be
carefully considered. As a matter of public policy, they can
be granted or denied to home rule localities. 3
It is true that a too detailed listing of powers would be undesir-
able because of the rigidity which it might introduce, but if care
is exercised to include therein only those matters which are con-
sidered likely to remain within the realm of essentially local
affairs, the enumeration would undoubtedly be advantageous.
There is another strong reason for this procedure. The actual
scope of local autonomy that the cities should enjoy is primarily a
question of policy; and it is wholly illogical to impose this func-
tion upon the judicial branch of the government. Yet this is
81. COLO. CONST. Art. XX, § 6; UTAH CONST. Art. XI, § 5 (1895).
82. COLO. CONST. Art. XX, § 6.
83. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENT, STATE---LOCAL RELATIONS
171, 172 (1946).
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exactly what is done when the grant is phrased in broad and in-
definite terms, and the courts are consequently called upon to de-
termine what concrete powers the city may actually exercise.
Since experience has shown that it is undesirable to leave matters
of policy as to state-city relations completely in the hands of the
legislature, the determination should be made with as much ex-
actness as possible by the terms of the fundamental law itself.
A third form of grant presently in use is that employed in
Wisconsin and New York.84 The constitutions of these states make
a partial enumeration of municipal powers, but also provide that
genuine general law supersedes both the sphere of undefined and
that of enumerated local powers. The Wisconsin constitution en-
powers self-chartered cities to ".... determine their local affairs
and government, subject only to this constitution and to such
enactments of the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with
uniformity affect every city or every village."' 8 5 The Model State
Constitution drafted by the National Municipal League follows
this method in its specification that both the general and the
enumerated grant or authority to the cities ". . . shall not be
deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature to enact
laws of state-wide concern uniformly applicable to every city."8'
Of the three types of provisions considered, the Wisconsin and
New York system has proved to be the most effective safeguard
for home rule. By recognizing the primacy of the state when
that primacy is exercised through general laws undiluted by
classification, the grant of local autonomy has elicited more
sympathetic treatment from both the legislature and the judici-
84. N.Y. CoNsT. Art. IX, §§ 12, 16; Wis. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
85. WIS. CONST. Art. XI, § 3.
86. MODEL STATE CONST. § 804 (5th ed. 1946). A somewhat novel ap-
proach to the problem of constitutional provisions for home rule is contained
in the recently published report of the American Municipal Association's
Committee on Home Rule. The recommended clause drafted by the Com-
mittee attempts to avoid the familiar distinction between general and local
affairs by providing:
... [A] municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter
may exercise any power or perform any function which the legisla-
ture has power to devolve upon a non-home rule charter municipal
corporation and which is not denied to that municipal corporation by
its home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter municipal
corporations by statute and is within such limitations as may be es-
tablished by statute.
FORDHADI, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOiMF RULE
19 (1953).
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ary. The requirement that a legislative enactment must apply
uniformly to all cities and towns before it can supersede the local
powers has acted as an adequate check on legislative interference
in the field of the enumerated powers; and in the undefined area
of "local or municipal concern," the courts have been inclined to
construe the phrase broadly knowing that the state can assert its
supremacy at any time the need arises by a general law. In Col-
orado, on the other hand, where the legislature is completely
barred from the undefined as well as the specifically defined
sphere of municipal affairs, the courts have given a more re-
stricted interpretation to the general grant. In either case, the
home rule enabling provisions in both the Colorado and the Wis-
consin type constitutions have helped to assure a larger measure
of local autonomy in those states than in Missouri. 7 It is unfortu-
nate that the constitution-makers of 1943-44 did not see fit to in-
corporate similar provisions into the new constitution. Should
home rule continue to spread in Missouri without a diminution in
the litigation surrounding it, serious consideration may have to
be given to the question of securing an amendment to the basic
law by popular initiative. In the meantime, the home rule cities of
the state might cooperate in an effort to supplement the constitu-
tional grant by securing a legislative enabling act which, like the
Colorado constitution, would specifically set out those powers
which the cities deem essential for local autonomy, coupled with
the proviso that the enumeration was in no way intended as com-
plete. Such a procedure would still leave the powers at the mercy
of the General Assembly, but it would at least eliminate some of
the uncertainty and a large portion of the litigation that con-
tinues to plague the home rule cities over the scope of their
authority.
In discussing home rule, there is a tendency on the part of
some of its advocates to place undue emphasis upon the right of
municipalities to govern themselves, thereby losing sight of the
fact that the city is an agent of the state as well as an organiza-
tion for the satisfaction of local needs. Home rule does not, and
87. The constitutional provisions for home rule in Wisconsin have been
accompanied by a body of exceedingly liberal legislation, so that the mea-
sure of local autonomy enjoyed by Wisconsin municipalities is probably
unsurpassed in any other state. This once again illustrates how important
the legislative attitude is to the success of local self-government. A hostile
legislature, as distinguished from an indifferent legislature, can cripple
even the most technically perfect constitutional system of home rule.
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certainly should not, imply complete freedom from state inter-
ference. It recognizes that in matters which affect the entire
state, the legislature should be supreme. The state-local interest
doctrine and the corporate-governmental standard are criteria
which the courts have employed in their attempts to define the re-
lationship between the state and the self-chartered community.
While it is easy to make a general distinction between affairs of
municipal and state interest, it is extremely difficult to select
a single function of city government and to argue convincingly
that it is an affair of purely local concern. The real and decisive
test should be whether the matter involved is of such concern to
the state as a whole that legislative interference is justified at the
expense of local autonomy. The successful application of such a
test obviously requires more than legal acumen. It calls for a
sympathetic understanding of the nature and objectives of local
rule and of the problems confronting municipal administration.
Only through such an approach can an adequate solution be found
to the dilemma of urban rule and the cities be assured of a desir-
able modicum of governmental autonomy. Constitutional home
rule, despite its defects and mechanical imperfections, still offers
the greatest measure of local self-government possible under the
American political system.
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